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WHEN GOOD POLICIES GO BAD: CONTROLLING
RISKS POSED BY FLAWED INCENTIVE-BASED
COMPENSATION
NICOLE VINCENT*
ABSTRACT
The recent Wells Fargo scandal revealed the harm that can result from flawed
incentive-based compensation arrangements. Large financial institutions have both a
legal and an ethical obligation to ensure that any incentive-based compensation
arrangements that are in place will not encourage risky or fraudulent employee
behavior. The continued existence of inappropriate and poorly structured
arrangements demonstrates that existing regulations are inadequate to ensure
compliance and protect consumers. Regulations should include increased penalties
and should more evenly distribute the burden of oversight and compliance between
the public and private sectors. In addition to regulatory reform, the government should
prosecute culpable high-level executives more aggressively. Arguably, white-collar
criminals are in a position to be more effectively deterred by the threat of incarceration
than other types of criminals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a scandal broke in the financial sector when the media revealed that
Wells Fargo employees had been opening new bank accounts for existing customers
without their knowledge.1 Since then, former Wells Fargo employees have explained
that the high-pressure atmosphere, specifically related to flawed incentive-based
compensation arrangements, led many of them to fraudulently open these accounts for
fear of losing their jobs if they failed to meet goals set by the company. 2 Large
financial institutions have both a legal and an ethical obligation to ensure that any
incentive-based compensation arrangements that are in place will not encourage risky
or fraudulent employee behavior at the expense of consumers. The ongoing existence
of these inappropriate, poorly structured incentive-based compensation arrangements
demonstrates that existing regulations are inadequate to ensure compliance and protect
consumers. Therefore, the government should reform existing regulations, prosecute
white-collar criminals more aggressively, or undertake some combination of both to
address this problem.
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act3 in 2010 to promote financial stability by, among other measures, protecting
consumers from “abusive financial services practices.”4 In 2011, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the National Credit Union Administration, and the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Agencies”) published a joint notice of
proposed rulemaking.5 The purpose of the proposed rulemaking was to implement §
5641(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires the appropriate regulators to prohibit
any type of incentive-based compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate

1 Renae Merle, Wells Fargo Boots 5,300 Employees for Creating Accounts Its Customers
Didn’t
Ask
for,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/09/08/wells-fargo-fined-185million-for-creating-accounts-its-customers-didnt-ask-for/.
2 Matt Egan, Workers Tell Wells Fargo Horror Stories, CNN (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/09/investing/wells-fargo-phony-accounts-culture/.
3

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
4

Id.

5

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed
Apr. 14, 2011).
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risks by financial institutions covered by the Act.6 However, since the proposed rule
was published, incentive-based compensation practices in the financial services
industry have evolved.7 Due to those changes, the Agencies proposed a new rule in
June 2016 to revise the proposed rule published in 2011 and more effectively
implement § 5641(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.8
While the 2016 proposed amendments are a step in the right direction toward
ending flawed incentive-based compensation practices, because they include punitive
features such as a clawback provision and stricter deferral requirements, more action
and harsher penalties are needed to protect consumers. This Note will argue that
executives in financial institutions should face criminal prosecution more frequently
to serve as a deterrent. This is necessary because in light of the benefit to the bottom
line these arrangements can offer the corporation, the prospect of incarceration may
be the only punishment stringent enough to deter executives from implementing or
approving these risky incentive-based compensation arrangements.9 Additionally, the
Agencies should modify the proposed new rule to impose more significant penalties
on executive officers or significant risk-takers, such as heightened clawback10
requirements, deferral provisions, and forfeiture.11 The threat of meaningful
punishment would further the deterrent effect intended by this proposed regulation. In
addition to modifying the new rule, new regulatory solutions should be considered to
improve efficiency in compliance and ensure meaningful enforcement.
Before turning to the new proposals, this Note will first examine the evolution of
these types of incentive-based arrangements, mainly focusing on arrangements within
large financial institutions; compare and contrast effective arrangements and risky
ones; and offer solutions to the dangers posed by improper incentive-based
arrangements. In Section II, this Note will look at incentive-based compensation
arrangements and examine their characteristics, explaining how well-structured
incentive-based compensation arrangements can benefit a company. Section II then
will explore how flawed arrangements can expose a company to risk. In Section III,
this Note will review the history and evolution of rules and regulations that have been
put in place in an attempt to cure the problems caused by risky incentive-based
compensation arrangements. This Note will highlight the role of penalties in the
regulations aimed at these arrangements. In Section IV, this Note will discuss the
6 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (2018) states that “the appropriate Federal regulators shall jointly
prescribe regulations or guidelines that prohibit any types of incentive-based payment
arrangements, or any feature of any such arrangement, that the regulators determine encourages
inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions . . . .”
7 Madeline Marsden, Incentive Compensation and Proposed Rules, FED. RES. BANK
ATLANTA (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.frbatlanta.org/economy-matters/banking-andfinance/viewpoint/2016/11/03/incentive-compensation-and-proposed-rules.
8 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670 (proposed June 10,
2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42).
9

See infra Section II.

10

“Clawback” provisions allow the company to take back compensation it has paid out.
Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37731 (defining “clawback” as
a “mechanism by which a covered institution can recover vested incentive-based compensation
from a covered person.”); see infra note 51.
11

See infra Section V.
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factors that have resulted in the persistence of flawed arrangements despite the rules
and regulations enacted to thwart them. Section IV also examines recent problems
caused by persisting problems.
In Section V, this Note will propose solutions. It will argue that deterrence should
be the goal of regulation and prosecution in this field. The government should
prosecute executives who implement or ratify risky compensation arrangements more
aggressively, as the government can accomplish deterrence through the threat of
certain (if brief) incarceration. Corporate criminal liability could offer a similar
deterrent effect as individual liability but with fewer evidentiary hurdles (though it
should not be viewed as a substitute). In the regulatory realm, the proposed rule should
require stricter penalties for executives who violate it, and those penalties should target
the executives’ salaries through deferral and clawback provisions. Beyond reforming
current regulations, this Note will propose significant changes to the regulatory
scheme to better account for the unique characteristic of the banking sector. If the
private and public sectors work together to write applicable regulations, benefits
accrue to both parties in the form of lower compliance costs and the conservation of
government resources. Further, a form of self-policing by members of the financial
sector could enhance current oversight and reduce the risk of superficial compliance
by institutions. Finally, this Note will offer a brief conclusion and look to the future.
II. BACKGROUND: WHY HAVE INCENTIVE-BASED ARRANGEMENTS?
The details of incentive-based compensation arrangements may vary between
institutions, but generally, all adhere to the principle of payment based on outcomes.12
For example, a company will pay an employee a bonus if he meets a certain sales goal,
thereby providing him with an incentive to sell more of the company’s product.
Examining the benefits that a company and an individual employee can gain though
an appropriately risk-minimized arrangement is useful to understanding the need for
regulating incentive-based compensation arrangements.
A. Benefits of Appropriate Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements
Financial institutions competing for talent may find that incentive arrangements
are necessary to attract and retain desirable employees.13 Well-structured
arrangements can benefit a company by promoting better performance of the
institution and individual employees.14 They can promote the health of a financial
institution by aligning the interests of executives and employees with those of the

12 See Stephen Bryan et al., CEO Compensation After Deregulation: The Case of Electric
Utilities, 78 J. BUS. 1709, 1710 (2005); Andrew Weiss, Incentives and Worker Behavior: Some
Evidence 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2194, 1987) (explaining that
“[b]ecause each employee is paid in accordance with his own output, a payment schedule can
be chosen to induce the optimal level of effort on the part of employees.”).
13

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37673.

14

Id.; Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV.
111, 128 (2010) (arguing that incentives are valuable because they tie the executive’s salary to
the corporation’s wealth, rather than a fixed salary in which the only incentive for the executive
is to keep his or her job).
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institution’s shareholders and other stakeholders. 15 Simply put, rewarding employees
of the financial institution for performance that benefits shareholders of the institution
can benefit both employees and institutions.
B. Risks Posed by Flawed Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements
On the other hand, incentive-based compensation arrangements can harm an
institution if the associated risks are not properly managed. If an employee’s salary is
made up largely of incentive payment, to the point that the employee depends on those
incentives as a part of his subsistence, then the employee no longer feels that the
incentive is a nice bonus if he makes his sales goals, but rather that he must make his
sales goal no matter what or that he feels pressure from the company to do so.16 In the
case of Wells Fargo, for example, workers reported that they faced intense pressure to
meet sales quotas from the management and were even threatened with termination if
they failed to sell enough products to customers.17 Further, large financial institutions
carry risks of negative externalities because they are interconnected with other
financial institutions, other companies, and even other markets.18 Large banks are key
players in many market segments such as private securitization and derivatives and
leveraged investor financing.19 If a large bank fails or experiences significant financial
problems, it can start a domino effect that depresses share prices across those markets
and related ones.20 Therefore, the negative impact from inappropriate risk-taking can
affect more than just the shareholders of the financial institution with a flawed
arrangement; it can affect the health of the United States economy as a whole. 21 For
15 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37673–74; Caywood,
supra note 14, at 128; Vincent K. Chong & Ian R.C. Eggleton, The Impact of Reliance on
Incentive-Based Compensation Schemes, Information Asymmetry and Organisational
Commitment on Managerial Performance, 18 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 312, 312–13 (2007)
(discussing the idea that compensation schemes are based on an agency theory framework and
that dysfunctional behaviors arise when the agent and the principal have different risk
preferences and conflicting goals based on information asymmetry).
16

See Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo’s Post-Scandal Pay Plan Eliminates Sales Goals,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-10/wellsfargo-unveils-retail-bank-pay-plan-in-response-to-scandal. Keller reports that Wells Fargo’s
new compensation plan “will skew more heavily toward base salary and less toward variable
bonuses,” and the company will base incentives on customer service rather than the number of
products sold. Id.
17

Planet Money: The Wells Fargo Hustle, NPR (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/10/07/497084491/episode-728-the-wells-fargohustle. A former Wells Fargo employee states that in 2009, her managers threatened to fire her
and put a mark on her permanent record if she did not meet her sales quota. Id.
18

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37674.

19

MARC LABONTE, CONG. RES. SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR “TOO BIG

TO FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (2017).
20

Id.

21

Id. at 4; see George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulations,
16 CATO J. 17, 17–18 (1996) (stating that bank failures are perceived to be more harmful than
other firms’ failures because of their potential for an effect “throughout the banking system . . .
.”).
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these reasons, reducing the risks posed by incentive-based compensation
arrangements is essential.
III. POST-CRISIS REGULATION
A. Initial Agency and Congressional Actions
Although these incentive systems can serve to align employee and shareholder
interests, flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements were identified as one
of the contributing factors to the financial crisis that began in 2007.22 To address these
practices, in 2010, the Federal Banking Agencies 23 adopted a Guidance on Sound
Incentive Compensation Policies based on three principles for improved incentive
compensation practices.24 According to these three principles, the institution should
provide employees incentives that appropriately balance risk and reward, the
incentives should comport with effective controls and risk-management, and, finally,
the incentive programs should be supported by strong corporate governance, including
active and effective oversight by the organization’s board of directors.25 While the
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies briefly mentioned penalties for
officials of the institution, it mainly focused on supervisory policy.26
Additionally, in late 2009, the Federal Reserve initiated a multi-disciplinary,
horizontal review of incentive compensation practices at twenty-five large, complex
banking organizations,27 citing that one of its goals was to help each agency implement
the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies.28 In its 2011 report on the
Horizontal Review, the Reserve noted that each institution could do more to promote
sound incentive-based compensation policies.29
In 2010, Congress established the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)
in 12 U.S.C. § 5491 to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial
22 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37674 (noting that
the foundation of sound risk management was undermined by the actions of employees who
were in a position to expose institutions to financial risk and sought to maximize their own
compensation through arrangements that failed to align employees’ interests with that of the
institution); see generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
(2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
(discussing
compensation arrangements that rewarded employees, including non-executives, for increasing
an institution’s short-term profit without sufficient recognition of the risks posed to the
institution and the market as a whole).
23

Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395–96 (June 25,
2010). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Office of Thrift
Supervision, Treasury are the Agencies behind the guidance. Id.
24

Id. at 36396.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 36397.

27

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES: A
REPORT ON THE HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1
(2011).
28

Id.

29

Id. at 2.
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products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”30 The statute requires
CFPB to present an annual report to Congress regarding consumer complaints
involving financial products and services received by the Bureau. 31 As an executive
agency, the CFPB is empowered to make and enforce regulations.32
1. Dodd-Frank and Implementation
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.33 It was meant, in part, to prevent
excessive risk-taking of the sort that led to the financial crisis in 2008.34 The DoddFrank Act specifically recognizes that incentive-based compensation arrangements
pose a danger, as the Act contains certain provisions aimed at regulating compensation
arrangements.35 One provision has a prescription that regulations require covered
financial institutions to disclose the structures of their incentive-based compensation
arrangements to the appropriate federal regulator to determine whether the
arrangements could lead to material financial loss at the institution. 36 Another
provision requires regulations prohibiting any type of incentive-based compensation
arrangement that the regulators determine “encourages” inappropriate risks by a
covered institution.37
2. The First Proposed Rule
In order to implement (b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, and supplement existing efforts
to curb flawed arrangements, the Agencies proposed a rule in 2011.38 This proposed
rule would have required that arrangements be consistent with the three principles
described in the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies: they should
balance risk and financial rewards, they should be compatible with effective risk

30 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2018); see About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) (stating that
the Bureau’s aim is to strengthen the economy by protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive,
or abusive practices and taking legal action against companies that violate the law).
31

12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(C) (2018).

32 Guide
to
Administrative
Law,
LIB.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php (last updated June 9, 2015).

CONG.,

33

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780).
34 See Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform
(last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
35

See 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2018).

36

Id. § 5641(a)(1)(B). Section (A) states that an additional purpose for disclosure of the
arrangements is to determine whether the arrangement “provides an executive officer,
employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered financial institution with excessive
compensation, fees, or benefits . . . .” Id. § 5641(a)(1)(A).
37

Id. § 5641(b).

38

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed
Apr. 14, 2011).
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management controls, and they should be accompanied by strong corporate
governance.39
In order to balance risk and reward, the rule proposed adjusting the amount of the
compensation award to reflect the risk that person’s activities pose to the institution;
deferring actual payment of the award until after the end of the performance period,
with the award adjusted for losses to the company that may become apparent during
the deferral period; and extending performance periods to better assess risk
outcomes.40 The rule would have prohibited arrangements that would encourage
employees to expose the institution to improper risks in pursuit of excessive
compensation.41 For larger financial institutions,42 the rule would have required
deferral of fifty percent of the incentive-based compensation for executive officers for
a period of three years.43 To be compatible with risk management controls, the rule
proposed that institutions have risk-management personnel that help to design the
compensation arrangements and a system in place for monitoring those personnel. 44
For strong corporate governance, the rule would have required oversight by the board
of directors and even stated that the board would be “ultimately responsible for
ensuring that the covered financial institution’s incentive compensation arrangements
are appropriately balanced.”45 The proposed rule also contained an anti-evasion
section, prohibiting institutions from evading the restrictions of the rule by indirect
acts, or acts through another entity, that would be unlawful if done directly—such as
classifying employees as independent contractors to circumvent the rule.46
Most comments on the 2011 proposed rule urged stronger discouragement for
risky compensation practices, such as imposing a longer deferral period for executive
bonuses, basing compensation practices on factors such as an institution’s bond price
or spread on credit default swaps, and including more disclosure requirements. 47
39

Id. at 21178–79.

40

Id. at 21179.

41

Id. at 21204 § 42.5(b). The proposed rule states that compensation would be excessive
when “amounts paid are unreasonable or disproportionate to, among other things, the amount,
nature, quality, and scope of services performed by the covered person.” Id. at 21178. The
factors to be considered when making this determination include “[a]ny connection between the
individual and any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse
. . . .” Id.
42

For financial institutions, this term means covered institutions with total consolidated
assets of $50 billion or more. Id. at 21173.
43

Id. at 21180.

44

Id. at 21179. The rule notes that these controls are important because employees may
seek to increase their own individual compensation by inappropriately influencing “the risk
measures, information, or judgments used to balance” the employee’s compensation. Id. at
21180.
45

Id.

46

Id. at 21183.

47

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37677 (proposed
June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42). These types of comments generally came
from private individuals, community groups, members of Congress, labor federations, and
pension funds. Id.
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Comments from covered financial institutions and financial industry associations
favored guidelines rather than rules to implement the Dodd-Frank Act, and some
opposed the deferral provisions, suggesting they would harm an institution’s ability to
attract and retain key employees.48
Following the 2011 proposed rule, foreign jurisdictions implemented a number of
rules to address compensation practices, most of which were stronger than the 2011
proposed rule.49 Some covered financial institutions operate in both foreign and
domestic markets and therefore are subject to the rules of every jurisdiction in which
the institution meets the standard for coverage.50 In June 2013, the European Union
adopted rules requiring, among other measures, that up to one hundred percent of the
variable remuneration shall be subject to clawback.51 The potential for an executive to
lose compensation that he has already received presents a significant deterrent effect
for engaging in risky behavior. Numerous jurisdictions with heavy financial presence,
including Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, adopted similarly enhanced rules and
guidelines.52
B. Evolving Needs in Regulating Compensation Arrangements
Because of the international evolution in compensation practices, the Agencies
recognized the need for consistency between United States and foreign rules53 and
therefore proposed a new rule in June 2016. 54 This new proposed rule was based on
the 2011 proposed rule; it retained the three key principles, but made changes to reflect
international developments in incentive compensation policies.55
48

Id.

49

Id. at 37678.

50

Id. at 37677–78.

51

See Council Directive 2013/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 94(n)(1), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 389.
52

For example, in Canada, see OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST. CORP.
GOVERNANCE, GUIDELINES (2013) (promulgating guidelines for the large institutions regulated
by Canada’s OSFI), but see John Tuzyk & Faye Ghadiani, Canadian Clawbacks: Increasing
(Jan.
16,
2014),
but
Still
Voluntary,
BLAKES
http://www.blakes.com/English/Resources/Bulletins/Pages/Details.aspx?BulletinID=1867
(noting that Canada does not legislatively mandate clawbacks rendering them unenforceable
under contract law; however, clawback provisions have become more prevalent in Canada
likely due to the influence of the OSFI guidelines). In Switzerland, see FINMA Publishes
Circular
on
Renumeration
Schemes,
FINMA
(Nov.
10,
2009),
https://finma.ch/en/news/2009/11/mm-rs-verguetungssysteme-20091111/
(noting
that
Switzerland’s Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”) “welcomes ‘clawback’ and
‘malus’ arrangements.”), but see FINMA Redefines Corporate Governance Guidelines for
Banks, FINMA (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/11/20161101-mm-rscorporate-governance-bei-banken/ (noting that FINMA decided not to introduce a clawback
clause in the updated “Remuneration schemes” circular).
53

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37678.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 37679; see supra note 38.
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As part of the risk/reward balance, the new rule would apply the three-year deferral
period to “significant risk-takers” in addition to the executive officers already included
in the 2011 proposed rule,56 thereby applying these safeguards more broadly. Deferred
compensation is compensation that is paid to the employee at a later date than which
it is earned.57 The new rule includes forfeiture and downward adjustment provisions
that would subject unvested, deferred compensation awards to reduction if certain
adverse outcomes were to occur.58 Significantly, the new rule would also require
clawback provisions in arrangements for senior executive officers and significant risktakers.59 Clawbacks are mechanisms “by which a covered institution can recover
vested incentive-based compensation from a senior executive officer or significant
risk-taker if certain events occur.”60 Officers or significant risk-takers would trigger
these mechanisms if they engaged in misconduct resulting in significant financial or
reputational harm, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used to
determine their incentive-based compensation.61
Regarding strong corporate governance, the new proposed rule required that the
board of directors obtain a written assessment of the institution’s incentive-based
compensation arrangements, including the institution’s risk control and compliance
policies.62 Yet, the 2011 proposed rule’s disclosure and recordkeeping requirements
were less detailed than those of the 2016 proposed rule.63

56

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37680.

57

See Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the
Structure of Executive Remuneration, 38 J. FIN. 1489, 1489 (1983) (stating that “[t]o relate an
executive’s reward more closely to his performance, firms can delay a large component of
compensation until better information is available, so that the amount of remuneration becomes
dependent upon indicators of performance.”).
58

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37804, § 42.7(b)(2)(i).
The adverse outcomes are:
(i) Poor financial performance attributable to a significant deviation from the [covered
institution’s] risk parameters set forth in the covered institution’s policies and
procedures; (ii) Inappropriate risk-taking, regardless of the impact on financial
performance; (iii) Material risk management or control failures; (iv) Non-compliance
with statutory, regulatory, or supervisory standards results in: (A) Enforcement or legal
action . . . brought by a federal or state regulator or agency; or (B) A requirement that
the covered institution report a restatement of a financial statement to correct a material
error; and (v) Other aspects of conduct or poor performance as defined by the covered
institution.
Id. at 37804–05, § 42.7(b)(2)(ii)–(v).
59

Id. at 37805, § 42.7(c).

60

Id. at 37681.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 37806, § 42.10.

63

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed
Apr. 14, 2011).
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C. Current State of Regulation
The federal government’s response to problems with incentive-based
compensation arrangements have been largely regulatory. The CFPB serves as a
(weak) outside source of oversight on financial institutions.64 The proposed rules to
implement Dodd-Frank’s reporting requirements and prohibitions on risk-prone
arrangements focus on controlling risks through internal supervision and balancing
risk and reward.65 The 2016 rule proposed heightened penalty provisions that would
be imposed if undesirable outcomes occur as a result of flawed arrangements and
notably recognizes the need for an anti-evasion provision.66 Although this evolution
suggests that the government has recognized the problems with relying on institutional
self-governance, current and proposed regulations do not impose strong enough
penalties to de-incentivize risky compensation arrangements. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider further measures to address these risks, both by modifying the
current proposed rule and by implementing structural regulatory changes to encourage
more efficiency and interaction between the regulatory bodies and the financial
institutions being regulated.
IV. CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH INCENTIVE-BASED ARRANGEMENTS
Despite currently enforced rules and the specter of future regulations, recent events
demonstrate that financial institutions are able to continue implementing incentivebased compensation practices that expose the company to significant risks and fail to
align the interests of employees with those of both the shareholders and the larger
market affected by the institution. Such arrangements can also affect consumers,
especially if sales goals pressure employees to sell customers banking products they
may not want or need.
A. The Wells Fargo Example
The scandals involving Wells Fargo provide an example of the persistent problem
with risky compensation arrangements and lack of internal oversight. Employees at
Wells Fargo engaged in “cross-selling,” or selling additional products to the same
customer.67 Cross-selling is attractive to banks because acquiring new customers is
much more expensive than retaining existing ones and simply selling more products
to those existing customers is more profitable.68 Of course, cross-selling relies on the
bank’s employees to sell the additional products to their customer. 69 The employees
must go beyond simply meeting the customers’ banking demands and convince them

64 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/federalagencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
65

See, e.g., Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37711.

66

Id. at 37690.

67

Yasar F. Jarrar & Andy Neely, Cross-Selling in the Financial Sector: Customer
Profitability Is Key, 10 J. TARGETING MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MARKETING 282, 282
(2002).
68

Id.

69

Id. at 287.
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to buy more products,70 such as additional accounts, credit cards, or home-equity
loans.
In the wake of the news that Wells Fargo employees had opened thousands of sham
accounts71—accounts existing customers had neither asked for nor even knew were
being opened in their names—employees have begun to comment on the immense
pressure to sell “solutions” and hit sales goals for which they would receive bonuses. 72
Employees reported that they were expected to sell eight new products per day, which
was then raised to twenty new products per day; if they did not hit their goals, Wells
Fargo would threaten them with termination. 73 This intense pressure to hit sales goals
resulted in extremely risky and fraudulent conduct—the opening of the sham
accounts—because employees were unable to meet such exacting goals legitimately.74
Employees were tacitly encouraged to commit fraud while the CEO looked the other
way.75
B. The Aftermath of Wells Fargo
After the sham accounts came to light, Wells Fargo fired over five thousand
employees.76 The organization fired only one area president, meaning the vast majority
of those fired were low-level employees.77 While no one would argue that those
employees who committed the fraudulent acts should not have been fired, arguably
those in positions of oversight should have been punished as well. The CFPB ordered
Wells Fargo to pay restitution to all victims, a $100 million fine to the CFPB’s Civil
Penalty Fund, a $35 million penalty to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,

70 Id. at 287–88 (emphasizing that employee sales skills are essential to cross-selling
success and that managers must discipline customer-service representatives to “discuss the
benefits of full account coverage” and “take ownership of the customer.” (footnote omitted)).
71 In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFBP-0015, states that the Bureau
concluded that Wells Fargo employees opened 1,534,280 accounts “that may not have been
authorized and that may have been funded through simulated funding, or transferring funds
from consumers’ existing accounts without their knowledge or consent.” Id. at *5.
72 See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Warned Workers Against Sham
Accounts, but ‘They Needed a Paycheck’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-warned-workersagainst-fake-accounts-but-they-needed-a-paycheck.html; see also Planet Money, supra note 17.
73

Planet Money, supra note 17.

74

See Corkery & Cowley, supra note 72.

75 See Stacy Cowley & Jennifer A. Kingson, Wells Fargo to Claw Back $75 Million from
(Apr.
10,
2017),
2
Former
Executives,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/wells-fargo-pay-executives-accountsscandal.html.
76 Laura J. Keller et al., Wells Fargo’s Stars Thrived While 5,000 Workers Got Fired,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-03/wellsfargo-s-stars-climbed-while-abuses-flourished-beneath-them.
77

Id.
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and $50 million to the City and County of Los Angeles. 78 In relation to Wells Fargo’s
revenue,79 these fines are negligible.
CEO John Stumpf appeared in front of the Senate Banking Committee and the
House Financial Services Committee, where members of Congress from both political
parties sharply criticized him for the scandal. 80 After pressure from the Senate
Committee, the board of directors of Wells Fargo announced that it would claw back
$41 million of Stumpf’s pay in the form of unvested stock awards. 81 The board has
since announced Stumpf’s decision to retire.82 He will be entitled to a $24 million
supplemental cash balance plan.83 Considering his salary, these measures are hardly
punitive.84 However, in April 2017, Wells Fargo’s board announced it would claw
back an additional $75 million in compensation from Stumpf and the former head of
community banking, Carrie L. Tolstedt.85 These clawbacks are the largest in banking
history.86 Wells Fargo also released a “Sales Practices Investigation Report” at the
time of the clawbacks87 that stated the “root cause of sales practice failures was the
distortion of [Wells Fargo’s] sales culture and performance management system,
which, when combined with aggressive sales management, created pressure on
employees to sell unwanted or unneeded products to customers . . . .”88

78

In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFBP-0015.

79

Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wells-fargopoints-to-the-failure-of-regulation.
80

Bob Bryan, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Got Raked over the Coals by Congress for
over 4 Hours, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/wells-fargo-ceojohn-stumpf-house-financial-services-congress-hearing-2016-9.
81 Geoff Colvin, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf’s $41 Million ‘Clawback’ Isn’t What It
Appears, FORTUNE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/03/john-stumpf-wells-fargoclawback/.
82 Matt Krantz, Wells Fargo CEO Stumpf Retires with $134M, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2016/10/12/wells-fargo-ceo-retires-underfire/91964778/.
83 Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Mar. 16, 2016). The
supplemental cash balance plan provides benefits in addition to the standard pension awards
and may provide benefits in excess of Internal Revenue Code limits. Id. at 64–65.
84

See id. at 39; Nomi Prins, Opinion, Ex-Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Deserves Jail—
(Oct.
14,
2016),
Not
a
Plush
Retirement,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/14/john-stumpf-retirement-wellsfargo-ceo-jail-time (reporting that “[f]or his penance, all Stumpf had to do was forfeit [$41
million] in restricted stock awards,” while his exit payout is currently valued at around $134
million).
85

See Cowley & Kingson, supra note 75.

86

Id.

87 See generally INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES
INVESTIGATION REPORT (2017), https://www.wellsfargo.com/assets/pdf/about/investorrelations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf.
88

Id. at Overview.
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At present, it does not appear the government will pursue criminal charges against
Stumpf. Before the Wells Fargo scandal, in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008,
the government engaged in very little criminal prosecution.89 Private litigation
between shareholders or injured customers in lieu of government prosecution may
serve to restore the plaintiffs, but it also often ends in settlements rather than judicial
opinions, which can provide guidance as to the legality of the institution’s behavior.90
Arguably, even if the proposed rule had been implemented, it would not have
prevented the scandal because the rule relies too heavily on internal self-policing—
and the outside watchdog groups, such as the CFPB, pale in size and resources
compared to the institutions they are responsible for monitoring. 91 Those in
responsible positions also historically have not been subject to any meaningful
criminal punishment in a way that would likely deter others from implementing such
arrangements or at least provide incentives to make sure such arrangements were not
ongoing. Therefore, solutions that rely on deterring executives from implementing
flawed incentive systems through the threat of prosecution or significant monetary
penalties, as well as regulatory solutions, will be more effective.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This Section proposes solutions through both criminal liability and regulatory
changes, both with a focus on deterrence as the underlying theory. Deterrence through
the threat of punitive measures is proposed as a solution to risky incentive systems
because of the nature of these systems—they require significant planning and analysis
and can be modified if problems arise. Therefore, executives responsible for
implementing incentive systems have the opportunity to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the sort that makes deterrence effective if the potential punishments are
strong enough.
A. Deterrence Through Criminal Liability
Holding individuals such as executives and managers criminally liable for crimes
proximately caused by bad policies for which they are responsible would effectively
deter these individuals from ratifying incentive arrangements they know to be flawed.
The threat of incarceration will be a more effective deterrent than the fines imposed
by regulatory violations, and although harsh, incarceration is justified in light of the
immense effect large financial institutions have on our economy. Relying on financial
institutions themselves or agencies to monitor incentive-based compensation
arrangements to ensure that they do not expose the company to risk is not an effective
solution, as demonstrated both by historical evidence and a simple comparison of the
relative size and resources of the institutions to the agencies tasked with monitoring
89 David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2014) (noting
the “surprising dearth” of individual penalties and suggesting that the government has moved
toward eschewing individual liability and endorsing entity liability).
90
Id. at 1414; James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo’s $142-Million Sham Accounts Settlement:
What You Need to Know, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fiwells-fargo-settlement-20170710-htmlstory.html.
91 See Davidson, supra note 79 (discussing the relative lopsidedness of the “watchdogs and
those they watch” and noting that the CFPB’s budget is roughly $600 million a year, while
Wells Fargo, just one of the many institutions the CFPB must monitor, pulls in revenues of more
than $80 billion annually).
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them.92 Under current regulations, those in positions of power can, through willful
blindness or superficial ethics and risk management training, insulate themselves from
any fallout if the policies backfire.93
Deterrence, as a theory of punishment, seeks to prevent crime by punishing a
wrongdoer and thus encourages those who might be tempted to commit the same crime
to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of sorts, which leads them to refrain from crime. 94
General deterrence seeks to deter others through the punishment of one defendant,
while specific deterrence seeks to deter the defendant re-offending through
punishment.95 Some scholars have suggested that deterrence as a theory of punishment
is unsound because there is little to suggest, and indeed it seems unlikely, that the
majority of criminals actually engage in a mental cost-benefit analysis prior to
committing a crime.96
However, a white-collar criminal differs from a “street-crime” offender in a
number of respects. Some of these key differences suggest that white-collar offenders,
especially those in high-powered positions such as executives at financial institutions,
can be effectively deterred.97 White-collar criminals, specifically high-level
executives, are arguably much more likely than other criminals to engage in just the
sort of cost-benefit analysis on which the theory of deterrence relies.98 While the
majority of street crimes involve the offender making a quick, often physically
affirmative choice of action within a short time frame, white-collar crimes are
generally schemes requiring a series of (non-physical) choices over a moderate to

92

Id.

93

See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 492 (2003) (stating that “firms engaged in legally
prohibited, but potentially profitable, conduct can reduce or eliminate liability” while giving an
“appearance of legitimacy to . . . stakeholders and the marketplace at large . . . by mimicking an
effective compliance system, without reducing the incidence of prohibited conduct within the
firm.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate
Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, J. CORP. L. 949, 958 (2006).
94 See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 396, 402 (J. Bowring ed., 1843).
Bentham states that in regard to the proportion between crimes and punishments, “[i]n matters
of importance, every one calculates. Each individual calculates with more or less correctness,
according to the degrees of his information, and the power of the motives which actuate him;
but all calculate.” Id.
95

SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (9th ed. 2012).

96 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953 (2003) (suggesting
that deterrence fails because it rests on the faulty expectation that potential criminals both are
aware of the law and make rational, self-interested choices.).
97

See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
468 (1997). The authors state that “[m]ore than because of the threat of legal punishment, people
obey the law . . . because they fear the disapproval of their social group if they violate the law .
. . .” Id.
98

Richard. A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 409, 410 (1980).
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lengthy time frame.99 High-level officials will certainly play a role in designing and
overseeing the incentive-based compensation arrangements within their company, and
these roles likely present opportunities for deliberation and weighing of consequences,
whether innocuous or criminal.
1. Why Individual Liability for High-Level Managers Is Appropriate
Criminal liability should be imposed on executives or managers in responsible
positions of oversight for compensation arrangements. This is appropriate because (1)
they are in positions to modify arrangements that encourage risky behavior, and (2)
they generally stand to gain the most from these arrangements; therefore, the deterrent
effect would balance the incentive to keep profitable (though risky) arrangements in
place. While some form of punishment is certainly appropriate for lower-level
employees who engage in significantly risky behavior, such as fraud, the best
protection for consumers and the larger market will come through eliminating the
flawed arrangements before lower-level employees engage in the risky behavior that
the arrangements encourage.
CEOs and similarly situated executives at financial institutions are, like many
white-collar criminals, in positions of trust. 100 An agency relationship exists between
executives (the principals) and the employees below them in the hierarchy of the
institution (the agents).101 Because institutions have numerous principals with discrete
interests, from CEOs to board members, who are significantly removed from the
agents, the “acting-for” relationship between the two groups is much more
asymmetrical and insulated than a traditional agency relationship.102
“Street-crime” offenders, such as those who perpetrate robbery or assault, harm
their victims directly. White-collar offenders, in positions of trust, “induce victims to
part with their money or property with lies, misrepresentations, and deceptions rather
than with brute force.”103
Not taking the threat of punishment into account, the cost-benefit analysis for the
individual may weigh in favor of commission of the crime (or concealment of the
wrongdoing), whereas for the corporation, honesty would be more profitable longterm.104 A significant penalty and a possibility of prosecution for an institutional

99 Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Causes of White-Collar Crime, 25 CRIMINOLOGY
949, 953 (1987).
100

See Susan P. Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept
of White-Collar Crime, 55 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 346, 347 (1990).
101

Id. at 354.

102

Id. at 349–50. Shapiro explains that “trust or fiduciary rules do not provide substantive
guidance regarding the exercise of the myriad agency roles that proliferate in complex
societies.” Id. at 350 (citations omitted); see Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the
Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 319 (1991).
103 See Shapiro, supra note 100, at 350. “Instead of cultivating mechanical technology to
break into a secured building, trustee ‘burglars’ cultivate social technology to become trusted
organizations . . . rich with opportunity for exploiting their positions for personal or corporate
advantage.” Id.
104 See John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 728 (1982) (discussing a hypothetical scientist who unlawfully
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officer in a responsible position would serve to de-incentivize the officer’s
concealment of or willful insulation from the wrongdoing, thereby tipping the costbenefit analysis in favor of refraining. 105
2. Corporate Criminal Liability
Although the theory of respondeat superior allows criminal liability to attach to a
corporation for criminal acts performed by certain employees acting within the scope
of their employment and on behalf of the corporation,106 punishing the corporation
may result in collateral damage. A punitive fine imposed on a corporation may be
passed on to innocent parties,107 such as to consumers in higher prices, to shareholders
in reduced dividends, or, in extreme circumstances, to the destruction of the entire
corporation.108 Each of these results can have a dampening effect on the market as a
whole. In light of the gargantuan resources of these large financial institutions, most
monetary punishments amount to little more than a bump in the road.109 However, that
is not to say that corporate liability should be abandoned in favor of individual liability
alone.110 Although corporate liability may not have a strong enough deterrent effect to
tip the scales of the cost-benefit analysis on its own, it can be an effective addition to
individual liability, especially in light of the damage corporate sanctions can have on
consumer trust.111 Of course, punishment of an executive official will undoubtedly
conceals safety studies for a product to save her job, while the company would benefit more in
the long-term from disclosure).
105 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2008),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
The
guidelines
emphasize that “[b]ecause a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of
individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate
wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if
it relates to high-level corporate officers . . . .” Id.
106 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY & JENNIFER TAUB, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 24–25
(6th ed. 2011); see N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494
(1909).
107

W.B. Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REV.
361, 405 (1977).
108 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing
the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 947 (2005).
109 For example, the CFPB will require Wells Fargo to pay out $185 million in fines, which
amounts to 3.3% of the $5.6 billion in net income Wells Fargo made in the second quarter of
2016. See John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-enforcement-what-hasgone-wrong/ (characterizing enforcement actions as “issuing modest parking tickets for major
frauds.”); but see Eric Holder, Don’t Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at A14
(opining that corporate fines that are essentially death penalties for corporations harm “innocent
Americans,” and “prosecutors must not give in to the pressures of the day and feel compelled
to indict more corporations simply because they can.”).
110

See U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, supra note 105, at 9-28.200(B) (stating that “prosecutors
should not limit their focus solely to individuals or the corporation, but should consider both as
potential targets.”).
111 See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Says Customers Shied Away After Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
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have a detrimental effect on shareholders in the short term; in the long term, punishing
offenders where deterrence is realistically possible and hopefully effective makes
more sense. This supports the conclusion that punishment would be most effective for
those individuals in responsible positions in the institution.
3. Sentencing for Optimal Deterrence
Punishments for corporations in the form of monetary penalties simply fail to have
the same deterrent effect as the threat of even brief incarceration for an individual.112
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ tough stance on white-collar criminals reflects the
idea that deterrence for white-collar criminals can best be achieved through certain
(though often short) prison terms.113 Even before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984114
reduced sentencing disparities and abolished parole, partially in an effort to reduce
“coddling” of white-collar criminals,115 courts have recognized that the certainty of
prison time upon conviction is key to effectuate deterrence among white-collar
defendants.116 The Guidelines’ designation of white-collar crime as “serious” and
meriting prison time also reflects the idea that society is willing to recognize whitecollar crime as equally worthy of punishment as street crimes. 117
says-customers-shied-away-after-scandal.html; Aaron Klein, Wells Fargo Shakes Consumers’
Trust in Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-shakesconsumers-trust-in-banks-1474561080; Jonnelle Marte, After Wells Fargo, Can You Trust Your
Bank?, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/getthere/wp/2016/09/20/after-wells-fargo-how-much-can-you-trust-your-bank/.
112 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some
Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (noting that monetary punishments for corporate
criminal liability “simply do not engage the emotions in the way that confinement of a human
being in a cell does.”).
113 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, at 8 (2009). The guidelines
explain:

Under pre-guidelines sentencing practice, courts sentenced to probation at an
inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes . . . that
in the Commission’s view are “serious.” The Commission’s solution to this problem
has been to write guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for which probation
was frequently given and provide for at least a short period of imprisonment in such
cases. The Commission concluded that the definite prospect of prison, even though the
term may be short, will serve as a significant deterrent . . . .
Id.; see BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 106, at 695.
114

18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–86 (2012).

115 See BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 106, at 694 (explaining that through the Sentencing
Reform Act, Congress sought to address the coddling of white-collar defendants by sentencing
judges who relied heavily on fines and probation).
116 Browder v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D. Or. 1975) (doubting that
“deterrence will be . . . effective until the ‘executive’ becomes convinced that if he embarks on
a criminal adventure, he will be severely—though proportionately—punished. Certainty is the
key.”).
117 See id. at 1046 (suggesting that white-collar criminals must expect equal or greater
punishment than street criminals because “[t]he consequences of white collar property crime
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4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Deferred Prosecution as Barriers to Deterrence
The biggest hurdle that comes with using criminal prosecution of responsible
individuals as a deterrent is prosecutorial discretion. Even the threat of brief
incarceration is likely enough to deter an individual from pursuing a criminal course
of action; however, the problem lies where there is no certainty or even any reasonable
probability that the individual will be prosecuted. When the executive has the
perception that there is very little risk of prosecution for his role in his company’s
improper incentive-based compensation schemes, he may indeed engage in the costbenefit analysis relied on by proponents of the deterrence theory. However, he may
well come to the conclusion that the benefits that spring from highly profitable
incentive schemes outweigh the slight risk of prosecution and the seemingly farfetched
fear of prison time. Therefore, the government must allocate resources to investigating
and consistently (or at least more than rarely) prosecuting the individuals in
responsible positions for fraud resulting from incentive-based compensation schemes.
Deterrence will not exist without a well-founded fear of real criminal charges. 118
One form of prosecutorial discretion is deferred prosecution. Deferred prosecution
is often relied on in white-collar and corporate crime cases,119 but fails to provide the
same deterrent effect as direct prosecution.120 In a deferred prosecution, a prosecutor
gets an indictment against an offender but defers prosecution if the offender
cooperates, often by admitting wrongdoing and correcting the violations that led to the
charges.121 If the prosecutor is satisfied that the offender has made the necessary
changes, such as correcting the incentive-based compensation arrangements that

tend to reach a higher magnitude in direct proportion to the level of status and power held by
the criminal involved.”); see generally Braithwaite, supra note 104.
118 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789,
1827–28 (2015).
119

From 2001 to 2014, there were sixty-six cases of deferred prosecution involving financial
institutions, including: Baystar Capital Management LLC (fraud), ConvergEx Group, LLC
(securities fraud), Deutsche Bank AG (tax fraud), Diamondback Capital Management LLC
(securities fraud), GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. (FCPA), German Bank HVB (tax
fraud), Jefferies Group LLC (fraud), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (antitrust), Louis Berger (fraud),
Mellon Bank, N.A. (theft), Merrill Lynch (false statements), Mirant Energy Trading (false
commodities reporting), NETeller PLC (illegal gambling), and Prudential Equity Group
(securities fraud). Id. at 1816 n.110; see also Joseph Warin, 2014 Year-End Update on
Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 18, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/18/2014year-end-update-on-corporate-deferred-prosecution-and-non-prosecution-agreements
(reporting that “[t]he decade-long trend favoring the use of [deferred prosecution agreements]
is expected to explode in 2015 . . . .”).
120

See Alan Vinegrad, Government Likely to Go After Corporations, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10,
2003, at A27, A28; see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 333 (2007).
121 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864
(2005).
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resulted in fraudulent behavior and possibly including payment of restitution, he may
dismiss the indictment and forgo the attachment of criminal liability. 122
Deferred prosecutions in white-collar crime and corporate crime cases have been
on the rise since the Justice Department introduced formal standards for prosecuting
corporations and added a focus on the authenticity of the offender’s cooperation. 123
Deferred prosecutions are undesirable from a deterrence perspective for a number of
reasons. First, if the corporation knows it can escape liability by fixing any compliance
problems during the deferral period, little incentive exists to create compensation
arrangements that comply in the first place.124 Second, deferred prosecution allows a
company to avoid most of the bad publicity that results from a conviction (or at least
from charges) because the indictment will likely be dismissed.125 Finally, the majority
of deferred prosecution agreements with corporations result in no individual liability,
thus defeating an additional disincentive to criminal conduct.126 If the desired result is
that the corporation and responsible individuals implement proper arrangements or
correct risky arrangements early, deterrence through criminal liability would be more
effective than deferred prosecution.
B. Regulatory Solutions
1. Strengthening and Reforming the Current Regulations
In addition to criminal prosecution, regulations can also be set up to provide a
deterrent effect through the threat of penalties. For regulatory penalties to effectively
deter executives from instituting flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements,
participating in them, or ignoring flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements
put in place by others, the penalties must be proportionately punitive, appropriately
triggered, and practically enforceable.
122 Id.; see Griffin, supra note 120, at 321 (describing deferred prosecution agreements as
“a form of probation, or ‘pretrial diversion,’ according to which the government agrees to
suspend charges against a company so long as the company fulfills every obligation set forth .
. . .”).
123 See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Component
Heads
&
U.S.
Att’ys
(June
16,
1999),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/chargingcorps.PDF; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to
Heads
of
Dep’t
Components
(Jan.
20,
2003),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003
jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Griffin, supra note 120, at 323 (noting
that deferred prosecutions are “not a new device, but they were rarely pursued in corporate
criminal cases until the Thompson Memorandum encouraged their use as an alternative to
indictment.” (footnotes omitted)).
124

See Greenblum, supra note 121, at 1864.

125

See Griffin, supra note 120, at 333 (stating that corporations “can use deferred
prosecution combined with individual culpability as a public relations tool to distance the
corporation itself from the employee offenders.”); Vinegrad, supra note 120, at A28 (noting
that deferred prosecution provides “another means by which a corporation that has engaged in
criminal wrongdoing can ultimately avoid the stigma and collateral consequences of a
conviction.”).
126

BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL 83 (2016) (noting that from 2001 to 2012, only
eighty-nine individuals were prosecuted out of 255 deferred or non-prosecution agreements).
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The most recently proposed rule by the financial Agencies is an improvement over
the 2011 proposed rule, as it includes a clawback provision. 127 The threat of the bank
recovering compensation from an executive in the event of undesirable outcomes
could serve to de-incentivize an executive from turning a blind eye to risky incentivebased compensation arrangements, as long as the clawbacks are triggered both if the
executive himself is awarded compensation via these arrangements and if he is in a
position to know about the existence of these arrangements. However, in order to be
effective, the amount of money subject to clawback must be proportionately punitive
to the executive. If only a small percentage of an executive’s pay is subject to loss due
to undesirable outcomes, the executive may believe the profits that might result from
the risky behavior outweigh the risk (or even the actual loss) of that amount.
Additionally, if the clawback is to be truly punitive, vested compensation should be
subject to clawback—the loss of unvested compensation is felt significantly less, as it
is money that has not truly been “paid out” yet.128 Further, putting clawback provisions
into an executive’s employment contract can make the threat of clawback much more
direct and, therefore, produce more of a deterrent effect. 129 The likelihood of
enforcement when clawback provisions are contained in employment contracts and
not just in regulations is greater.130
Deferral and forfeiture can serve similar goals as clawback provisions by reducing
risk-taking behavior through putting part of an executive’s pay at stake. 131 Although
the 2016 proposed rule includes these tools, 132 for a true deterrent effect, the deferral
period must be longer than suggested by the rule, which currently has a period of three
years.133 A longer deferral period in which unvested awards are subject to forfeiture
will help align the executive’s interest with those of the shareholders and the market
at large,134 and the executive will in turn be motivated to align policy carried out by
lower-level employees with those interests.
127 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37805, § 42.7(c) (proposed
June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42).
128

See Prins, supra note 84 (noting that Stumpf’s exit payout is a “plush parachute,” as his
only penance was forfeiting stock he did not even fully own yet).
129 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 420–
21 (2009) (discussing writing clawback provisions directly into employment contracts as a
“bottom-up” approach to reform rather than the “top-down approach” of regulatory reform).
130

Id. at 421–22.

131 See Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt
Incentives, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3813, 3813 (2011) (arguing that large deferred compensation
plans for top managers might cause them to manage their companies conservatively, “avoiding
risk and preserving liquidity . . . .”).
132

Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37680.

133

Id.

134

See Cherry & Wong, supra note 129, at 392 (arguing that executive focus on short-term
performance “often leads to opportunistic behavior, at the expense of the long-term health of
the company.”); Rebecca A. Crawford, Note, Corporate Governance Reform: How to Promote
the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 905, 923 (2009)
(stating that “slowly vesting stock options will incentivize directors and executives to focus on
the long-term health of their corporations.”).
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2. Increased Regulatory Effectiveness Through Cooperative Governance
However, for these strengthened regulations to have any effect, they must be both
enforceable and actually enforced.135 Currently, the bodies charged with oversight of
incentive arrangements of financial institutions are the group of financial Agencies
that promulgated the 2011 and 2016 proposed rules on incentive-based compensation
arrangements and, to a more general degree, the CFPB.136 These watchdogs are
relatively small in comparison to the size and resources of the financial institutions
they are watching.137 However, dramatically increasing the size of the regulatory
bodies simply is not feasible.138 Instead, the regulations should be made more
effectively enforceable by emphasizing strategies that ensure companies are truly
taking steps to monitor risks posed by their incentive-based compensation schemes
and are not superficially complying for the sake of meeting the requirement. 139 Two
forms of self-regulation could be useful in this regard: “partial” self-regulation, in
which the financial institution engages in rulemaking, and “full” self-regulation, in
which the financial institution engages in both rulemaking and enforcement. 140
3. Institution-Designed Regulations
A more interactive regulatory scheme can benefit both institutions and
consumers.141 If financial institutions are allowed to ensure that their incentive-based
135 An additional consideration is the moral hazard that results when the government bails
out risk-taking institutions, leading to those in a position to expose the company to risks to do
so with perceived impunity. See Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts
Together Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the
2008–2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371, 419 (2010); see also Ronald
M. Giammarino et al., An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation, 48 J. FIN. 1523, 1524
(1993) (stating that “in practice, monitoring is only imperfectly informative, and regulators are
often unable or unwilling to act on the information they receive.”).
136 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements of 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (proposed
Apr. 14, 2011).
137

See Davidson, supra note 79.

138

See Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Private Sector’s Role in Deterring Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 93, 94, 96 (1997) (stating that because the
government is unlikely to increase its resources, in policing financial sectors “there has been
and must continue to be a shared responsibility [between the government and the private
sector].”).
139

See Krawiec, supra note 93, at 487, 491 (arguing that many internal compliance
structures “do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a windowdressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability,” leading to
an under-deterrence of corporate misconduct and a proliferation of costly—but arguably
ineffective—internal compliance structures.).
140
See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, in 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 115 (M.D.A.
Freeman ed., 2002).
141 See generally Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1309, 1309 (2015) (proposing that gaps in regulation can be filled by allowing the regulated
entity to choose how to meet the regulation standard and more closely align the goals of the
regulators and the regulated).
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compensation schemes comply with the regulations through methods designed largely
by the institution and approved by their regulating bodies, companies will be less
likely to expend their resources designing compliance programs that are solely in
places to jump through the hoops of the regulations. 142 Alternatively, regulation could
be designed at an industry level, or even firm-by-firm, by a panel of individuals with
experience in the financial industry, as a modified form of self-regulation,143 which
would help cure problems caused by high levels of complexity in the financial sector
and the regulatory agencies’ inability to effectively account for that complexity.
Regulations formulated primarily by the financial institution would internalize some
of the costs of promulgating rules formerly borne by the agencies or at least reduce
them by cutting down on the costs of research. 144 However, such regulation would
require governmental oversight to ensure that the industry-designed rules are not selfserving, as compared to rules designed by outsiders.
4. Institution-Enforced Regulations
A similar idea involves creating an independent body charged with oversight of
compensation arrangements and comprised of individuals who work in the financial
industry. This body would not be a substitute for government regulation, but rather an
addition to maximize efficiency and oversight. 145 A specialized committee like this
would be able to monitor financial institutions efficiently because of its familiarity
with and knowledge of the industry (as opposed to bodies with a broad range of areas
for which they are responsible for monitoring). 146 This form of self-regulation would
reduce an institution’s ability to shield itself from penalties through risk-management
measures that are merely put in place for the sake of compliance; a committee made
up of industry insiders could effectively see through the sham.
Although this proposal presents the threat of insiders protecting each other or
engaging in “back-scratching” that could undermine the effectiveness of such a

142 See Bowman, supra note 112, at 674–75; see also John Braithwaite, Enforced SelfRegulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1470–71
(1982) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation] (arguing for a form of “enforced
self-regulation” in which the government would compel a company to write a set of rules
“tailored to the unique set of contingencies facing that firm.”); Krawiec, supra note 93, at 493
(explaining that to comply with traditional regulations, companies “are forced to adopt costly
additional internal compliance structures in order to avoid the risk of harsh penalties when
violations occur . . . .”).
143 See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as a Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 470–80 (2011) (proposing “embedded self-regulation”
in the financial sector as an addition to governmental regulation, encouraging participation by
lowering the costs of compliance).
144

See Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation, supra note 142, at 1471.

145
Id.; see Anil K. Gupta & Lawrence J. Lad, Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic,
Organizational, and Political Analysis, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 416, 417 (1983) (discussing a
system in which industry self-regulation is auxiliary or complementary to governmental
regulation).
146 See Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation, supra note 142, at 1469 (arguing that “[t]he
power of corporate inspectors to trap suspected wrongdoers is often greater than that possessed
by government investigators.”).
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committee,147 certain measures can ensure that self-regulation is truly in the interest of
the public. For example, the self-regulating body will likely need to report to
governmental regulating bodies frequently to encourage transparency and
accountability and to allow the government to step in if the reports indicate emerging
systemic risks.148 Finally, banks may embrace the ability to regain public trust by
participating in a form of self-policing, thereby furthering consumer confidence and
enjoying positive publicity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without intervention, flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements will
continue to expose financial institutions and the public to serious risks. Instituting the
threat of more serious penalties imposed by regulations, creating regulations that
encourage more than mere superficial compliance, and pursuing criminal prosecution
where appropriate can halt the current trend of incentive-based compensation
arrangements that encourage risky employee behavior at financial institutions. Current
and proposed regulations and increasingly lax prosecution are inadequate because they
do not offer enough of a deterrent effect, a theory of punishment that could prove more
successful than others in the realm of white-collar crime.
Incentive-based arrangements are standard procedure in many large companies, so
a company is practically required to offer them to attract the most desirable workers
in a competitive environment.149 Incentive systems also serve independent goals that
benefit shareholders and the public, such as rewarding profit maximization and
encouraging a healthy economy through strong markets. If properly implemented and
maintained, incentive-based systems can offer significant benefits that make them
worthwhile, which would mean improving these systems rather than outlawing them
entirely is desirable.
The government should prosecute executives responsible for incentive-based
compensation arrangements that they know to be flawed and that result in fraudulent
employee behavior at the expense of consumers. As articulated by the Sentencing
Guidelines, the threat of short but certain jail time will have a true deterrent effect on
potential white-collar offenders. Because these crimes generally occur over a
relatively long period of time and involve a series of deliberate, thoughtful decisions,

147 For a discussion of problems with self-interest and independence in oversight groups,
see William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439
(2003).
148 See Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States:
A Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS 443,
465, 473 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (stating that business selfregulation works best when those responsible for it know “not only that poor performance will
trigger sanctions, but also that if business institutions systematically fail to achieve regulatory
objectives, a more vigorous regulatory shotgun [governmental intervention] waits in the
wings.”); Omarova, supra note 143, at 485–86 (arguing that industry self-regulation “requires
that the government agency overseeing the self-regulation process maintain the strong capacity
for investigation of potential malfeasance by private actors and enforcement of legal and
regulatory requirements.” (footnote omitted)).
149

Catherine Oak, Ten Ways to Attract and Retain Great Employees, INS. J. (July 7, 2003),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-mindyourbiz/2003/07/07/30612.htm.
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white-collar crime is uniquely suited for achieving effective deterrence through
punishment.
More punitive clawbacks to vested compensation, longer deferral periods, and
reformed regulatory structures would offer those in responsible positions at financial
institutions an incentive both to monitor incentive-based compensation strategies for
potential risk exposure and put a stop to those that expose the institution to significant
risk. This would work to align the interests of executives with the interests of
shareholders, as well as protect the consumer.
Further, the regulations will be more effective and foster benefits for the institution
as well as the consumer if they allow the institutions to work with the government in
creating the rules. If banks can tailor their monitoring and reporting of incentive-based
compensation arrangements, they can save money because compliance will be more
realistic and responsive to the unique demands of the financial sector and less likely
to be merely superficial compliance. Additionally, the government can use the
expertise of industry leaders and save on regulatory resources.
An independent oversight body made up of industry insiders, in addition to
government watchdogs, is another form of interactive governance that could benefit
the industry. Keeping in mind the threat of industry executives turning the other way
to protect their own interests, a specialized oversight committee would be able to
detect potentially risky trends caused by compensation arrangements before they
result in harm to the consumer. A reduction in flawed incentive-based compensation
arrangements at large financial institutions will result in better working environments
for employees, sustainable long-term profitability for shareholders, and a more stable
economy. For our banking system to function, the public must regain trust in its
financial institutions.150 Banks have historically been pillars of the community and a
symbol of stability,151 and if bank executives continue to pursue the goal of
maximizing profit at any cost, banks will never regain their place of trust in society.
Banks should make profits—this is the proper purpose of a corporation.152 However,
they must not lose sight of the vital role of public trust in this endeavor. In order to
ensure the stability of our economy as a whole, the government must step in to put an
end to flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements.

150 See Steve Denning, How Can Bankers Recover Our Trust?, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/02/06/will-we-ever-trust-bankersagain/#14707ece377d (noting that “trust is the very foundation of banking” and that trust in
banks is historically low in recent years as a result of banks’ single-minded pursuit of “bad
profits” at the expense of the best interest of customers).
151

Id.

152

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasizing that “[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”);
but see James R. Barth et al., Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of
Broad Banking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191–204 (2000).
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